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On Copyright’s Authorship Policy 
 
Tim Wu†  
 
 On May 4, 2001, a one-man corporation named Bridgeport Music, Inc. 
launched over 500 counts of copyright infringement against more than 800 
different artists and labels.1  Bridgeport Music has no employees, and other 
than copyrights, no reported assets.2  Technically, Bridgeport is a “catalogue 
company.”  Others call it a “sample troll.” 
  
 Bridgeport is the owner of valuable copyrights, including many of funk 
singer George Clinton’s most famous songs—songs which are sampled in a 
good amount of rap music.3  Bridgeport located every sample of Clinton’s and 
other copyrights it owned, and sued based on the legal position that any 
sampling of a sound recording, no matter how minimal or unnoticeable, is 
still an infringement. 
 
During the course of Bridgeport’s campaign, it has won two important 
victories.  First, the Sixth Circuit, the appellate court for Nashville adopted 
Bridgeport’s theory of infringement.  In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films,4 the defendants sampled a single chord from the George Clinton tune 
“Get Off Your Ass and Jam,” changed the pitch, and looped the sound.  
Despite the plausible defense that one note is but a de minimus use of the 
work, the Sixth Circuit ruled for Bridgeport and created a stark rule: any 
sampling, no matter how minimal or undetectable, is a copyright 
infringement.  Said the court in Bridgeport,  “Get a license or do not sample. 
We do not see this as stifling creativity in any significant way.”5   In 2006 
Bridgeport convinced a district court to enjoin the sales of the bestselling 
                                            
 † Professor, Columbia Law School.  I am grateful to Jane Ginsburg, Lior Strahilevitz, 
Clarisa Long, and Molly S. Van Houweling for the discussions that led to this draft, as well 
as several generations of advanced copyright seminar students at Columbia Law School and 
Virginia University School of Law.  Nicole Altman and Wayne Hsiung provided additional 
feedback and research assistance. 
 1 Tim Wu, Jay-Z Versus the Sample Troll, Slate Magazine, Nov. 16, 2006, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2153961/.  
2 See Bridgeport Music, Inc.’s corporate entity details, Michigan Department of Labor 
& Economic Growth, available at 
http://www.dleg.state.mi.us/bcs_corp/dt_corp.asp?id_nbr=190824&name_entity=BRIDGEPO
RT%20MUSIC,%20INC (last visited Mar. 18, 2007). 
 3 See Wu, supra note 1. 
4 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
5 Id. at 801. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=984947
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Notorious B.I.G. album, Ready to Die, for “illegal sampling.”6  A jury then 
awarded Bridgeport more than four million dollars in damages.7  
 
 The Bridgeport cases have been heavily criticized, and taken as a 
prime example of copyright’s excesses.8  Yet the deeper problem with the 
Bridgeport litigation is not necessarily a problem of too much copyright. It 
can be equally concluded that the ownership of the relevant rights is the root 
of the problem. George Clinton, the actual composer and recording artist, 
takes a much different approach to sampling. “When hip-hop came out,” said 
Clinton in an interview with journalist Rick Karr, “I was glad to hear it, 
especially when it was our songs—it was a way to get back on the radio.”9  
Clinton accepts sampling of his work, and has released a three CD collection 
of his sounds for just that purpose.10  The problem is that he doesn’t own 
many of his most important copyrights.  Instead, it is Bridgeport, the one-
man company, that owns the rights to Clinton’s work.  In the 1970s 
Bridgeport, through its owner Armen Boladian, managed to seize most of 
George Clinton’s copyrights and many other valuable rights.  In at least a few 
cases, Boladian assigned the copyrights to Bridgeport by writing a contract 
and then faking Clinton’s signature.11  As Clinton puts it “he just stole ‘em.”12  
With the copyrights to Clinton’s songs in the hands of Bridgeport—an entity 
with no vested interest in the works beyond their sheer economic value—the 
targeting of sampling is not surprising.   
 
 
t r
e
6 Jeff Leeds, Judge Freezes Notorious B.I.G. Album, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2006, at 
E2.   
7 Id.   
8 See, e.g., Matthew R. Broodin, Comment, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films: The Death of the Substantial Similarity Test in Digital Samping Copyright 
Infringemnt Claims—The Sixth Circui ’s Flawed Attempt at a B ight Line Rule, 6 Minn. J. 
L. Sci. & Tech. 825 (2005); Jeffrey F. Kersting, Comment, Singing a Different Tune: Was the 
Sixth Circuit Justified in Changing the Protection of Sound Recordings in Bridg port Music, 
Inc. v. Dimension Films?, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 663 (2005) (answering the title question in the 
negative); John Schietinger, Note, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the Sixth 
Circuit Missed a Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 209 (2005).  
9 Interview by Rick Karr with George Clinton, at the 5th Annual Future of Music 
Policy Summit, Wash. D.C. (Sept. 12, 2005), video clip available at 
http://www.tvworldwide.com/showclip.cfm?ID=6128&clip=2 [hereinafter Clinton Interview]. 
10 George Clinton, Sample Some of Disc, Sample Some of D.A.T., Vols. 1-3 (1993-94).  
11 Sound Generator, George Clinton awarded Funkadelic master recordings (Jun. 6, 
2005), http://www.soundgenerator.com/news/showarticle.cfm?articleid=5555.  
12 Clinton Interview, supra note 9.   
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* * * 
 
 The Bridgeport litigation shows that an excess of author’s rights is not 
always the source of the perceived abuses of copyright, or how copyright gets 
a bad name.13  Instead, lack of authorial control can sometimes be the 
problem.  The relationship between authors and copyright is as old as the law 
itself, but today’s conditions merit a new look.14
 
 It has long been the stated aspiration of copyright to make authors the 
masters of their own destiny.  Yet more often than not, the real subject of 
American copyright is distributors—book publishers, record labels, 
broadcasters, and others—who control the rights, bring the lawsuits, and 
take copyright as their industries’ “life-sustaining protection.”15  Modern 
American copyright history revolves heavily, though not entirely on 
distributors, either asking for more industry protection, or fighting amongst 
themselves.16  
 
 This paper addresses two related questions about the relationship 
between authors and the copyright system, and shows how they are linked.  
First, if distributors are central to copyright, why have authorial rights at all, 
as opposed to rights that vest automatically in distributors upon publication?  
This paper concedes that the basic incentive system central to copyright could 
in fact operate based on a system of distributor’s copyrights, as it already 
does in many areas thanks to widespread assignments and the work-for-hire 
doctrine. 
 
f
c
 13 See The Patry Copyright Blog, How Copyright is Getting a Bad Name, 
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2006/04/how-copyright-is-getting-bad-name.html (Apr. 25, 
2006, 7:00AM); Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 Colum. J. L. 
& Arts. 61 (2002).  
 14 For an extraordinary, recent look at the relationship between copyright and 
authors, see Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited, (2006), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=869446.  
 15 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 
4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, 
and the Administration o  Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong, 2d Sess. 
5 (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America).  
16 See generally Tim Wu, Copyright’s Communications Poli y, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 278 
(2004).  On the other hand, author’s groups have occasionally played a pivotal role in 
copyright policy.  See, e.g., Thomas Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology, 6 Green 
Bag 2d 37, 37-38 (2002) (relating efforts of Noah Webster and others to have copyright laws 
enacted in the early republic). 
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 For that reason, the paper introduces a new justification for authorial 
ownership of copyright—both the vesting of the initial copyright in authors, 
and for providing ways for the right to find its way back to authors.17  The 
argument relies on the concept of authors as agents of decentralization in the 
copyright system.  Vesting rights in authors, the argument goes, provides 
new ways to seed the development of both new forms of distribution, and also 
support for changing modes and forms of creation. Centuries ago in England, 
authorial copyright helped introduce competition into bookselling, beyond an 
centralized publisher’s cartel.  Today, there are lessons for copyright’s 
authorship policy in the more than five million items under Creative 
Commons licenses,18 the proliferation of Open Access licensing in academia, 
and the use of open source licenses by commercial entities like IBM and 
Apple.  These experiments show the potential of a decentralized copyright 
system for promoting a full range of production modes. 
  
 Second, this paper takes on the question of how copyright should try to 
encourage authorship.  The question is obviously not an easy one.  Echoing 
others but framing the problem slightly differently, I suggest that the 
challenge for copyright’s authorship policy is slightly different then has 
usually been described. I agree with the premise that copyright should not 
focus on a single “type” of authorship.19  But I think we might usefully 
compare the problem of authorship in copyright to one of industrial 
organization.  If we accept that there are multiple potentially successful 
modes of authorship—a point discussed more fully below—then the question 
is not just how to promote authorship, but how to promote various and 
competing modes of authorship. Just as the economic system at large needs 
to provide conditions under which sole proprietorships, small business and 
large corporations can coexist, so too should the goal of managing information 
production be as impartial as possible. This means that the goal of copyright’s 
authorship policy should be neutrality: a system that declines to favor any 
mode of production over others, on the premise that optimization in favor of 
one mode will deoptimize for others. 
 
 
17 Most prominently, through the termination doctrine.  See 17 U.S.C. § 203; see also 
infra Pt. V.   
 18 See generally Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Mar. 18, 
2007). 
 19 See, e.g., James Boyle, Shamans Software and Spleens 119 (1996).  
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 Fans of alternative production and remix culture sometimes prescribe 
large reductions in the scope of copyright, or even the abolishment of 
copyright altogether.20  But such arguments face at least one serious problem:  
enforceable rights may sometimes be useful for maintaining the integrity of 
both open and closed works.21  It is partially based on a threat of copyright 
enforcement that BioMed Central’s highly respected open access journals 
publish articles “freely available to all” yet at the same time require that 
“integrity is maintained and its original authors, citation details and 
publisher are identified.”22  Creative commons depends on copyright, and is 
the underlying threat of copyright enforcement helps keep open source open 
and free software free by forcing improvers to share their source code.  Every 
mode of production, even those that strive to keep works open and free 
require some mechanism, whether legal or otherwise, to prevent behavior 
that would ruin the project.23  
 
  Since legal rights can keep works open as well as closed, it is perhaps 
not necessarily the existence of rights so much as the allocation of 
enforcement decisions that drives the nature of copyright’s authorship 
system.  Who gets to decide how copyright will be enforced decides what kind 
of information economy we live in.  Many of today’s perceived abuses of 
copyright may be problems not of the scope of copyright but of inefficient 
enforcement. 
  
 Finally, the two questions are linked.  This paper argues that the keys 
to a neutral system are mechanisms that promote decentralization of 
copyright ownership and enforcement, and posits that authorial rights are a 
key means towards decentralization.  As described above, early copyright 
came up with one such system: the innovation called authorial copyrights, as 
distinct from stationer’s (or publisher’s) copyrights.  The great if perhaps 
 
 20  See, e.g., Joose Smiers, Abandoning Copyright: A Blessing for Artists, Art, and 
Society (Nov. 26, 2005), http://www.culturelink.org/news/members/2005/members2005-
011.html.  
21 What I mean by open and closed works is discussed infra Pt. I (modes of 
authorship discussion).   
 22 See BioMed Central Copyright Policy, 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/about/copyright (last visited Feb. 24, 2007). 
 23 To be sure, as just suggested, it is sometimes non-legal mechanisms that preserve 
the integrity of a project.  Wikipedia’s editors, for example, don’t sue unruly users—they 
scold them and sometimes shame them. See Wikipedia: Vandalism, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Vandalism (last visited Mar. 17, 2007).   
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accidental idea of the 1710 Statute of Anne was to allocate copyright in the 
author instead of the publisher or the King.24  By splitting the atom of 
copyright between creator and disseminator, the statute led eventually to the 
competing modes of production and dissemination we see today. 
 
 Yet the role of the author in copyright has shrunk over the last 
century, not grown, and the full potential of the author as an instrument of 
copyright decentralization has not been reached.  Too much of the debate over 
authors in copyright begins and ends with a discussion of European-style 
moral rights.25  The point of this paper is that role of the author in copyright 
goes far beyond discussions of moral rights.  Authors are copyright’s agents of 
decentralization, and one of the ways copyright can adapt to cultural and 
technological change. 
  
 The main points of this paper are to identify the relationship between 
decentralized copyright and a more neutral copyright system, and also to 
stress the role that the initial allocation of copyright in the author already 
plays in driving multiple modes of production.  Part I provides an economic 
rationale for an authorial copyright system.  Part II describes various modes 
of authorship and argues that different modes are optimal in different 
contexts.  Part III lays the case for a copyright system that is neutral as 
between different modes of authorship.  Part IV briefly explores a historic 
example of how authorial rights have performed a role in copyright 
decentralization.  Finally, Part V examines the termination of transfer right 
in light of this economic theory of authorship.  
 
I. Why Give Copyright to Authors? 
 
 With some exceptions, copyright vests in authors at the moment of 
fixation.26  That’s the law, but the economic, as opposed to moral, rationale 
 
t
t
 24 See infra Pt. IV for a discussion of the Statute of Anne. 
25 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: 
A Compara ive Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. Legal Stud. 95 (1997); see also Jane C. 
Ginsburg, The Concept of Author in Compara ive Copyright Law, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 1063, 
1092 (2003) (concluding that “[b]ecause, and to the extent that, [the author] moulds the work 
to her vision (be it even a myopic one), she is entitled not only to recognition and payment, 
but to exert some artistic control over it”).  
 26 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in 
the author or authors of the work.”).  The principle exception is in § 201(b), the work for hire 
doctrine.   
 
 
 
On Copyright’s Authorship Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 7
                                           
for such vesting is not completely clear.  The argument for granting rights to 
encourage production of creative works is clear enough, but if encouraging 
creation is the only goal, the rights could be (and once were) granted to 
distributors rather than authors.  As distributors point out, the bulk of the 
financial risk in a creative work is usually borne by the distributor, and so it 
is they, and not the authors, who perhaps most need safeguards against 
freeriding provided by copyright.  In practice, in the United States copyright 
is already in many creative industries a right that ends up in the hands of 
distributors or the companies that employ creators.27   
 
 We can imagine an alternative scenario in which copyright, even if an 
author’s right pre-publication, vested in distributors at the moment of public 
distribution (or “first publication”).   Indeed we need not imagine, as this was 
the rule in early English copyright where, as Oren Bracha writes, “it  
was Stationers and Stationers only that could register copyright.”28 That 
arrangement would, as much as vesting copyright in authors, help protect the 
investment in the work, and ultimately provide similar incentives to produce 
creative works. However, that system also no longer a system of authorial 
copyright. Is anything wrong with that?  Why bother with authorial copyright 
at all? 
 
 I suggest that there are good reasons for authorial copyright, though 
reasons different than those usually suggested.  First, some copyright 
scholars defend the fact that copyright often operates as a distributor’s, as 
opposed to author’s right  by simply suggesting that the two share the same 
interests. Here is how point was put by Zechariah Chafee in 1945: 
 
[M]uch of the tax which the Copyright Act imposes 
on readers goes directly to publishers.   
Then is not the talk of helping authors just a 
pretense? . . . 
 
27 That fact is clearest in the film and commercial software industries, where the 
work-for-hire doctrine vests most of the relevant copyrights in distributing firms.  In 
journalism, publishing and music industries, moreover, mandatory assignments of copyright 
accomplishes much the same effect.  There are of course exceptions to this, like the rights 
held by ASCAP (The American Society of Composers, Artists, and Performers), a performing 
rights organization that licenses and distributes royalties for the public performances of the 
copyrighted works of its members.  See About ASCAP, http://www.asacap.com/about/ (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2007).  
 28 See Bracha, supra n. __, at 113.  
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. . . .  
One reason . . . for protecting the copyright 
in the hands of the publisher is to give an indirect 
benefit to authors by enabling them to get royalties 
or to sell the manuscript outright for a higher price.  
A second reason is, that it is only equitable that the 
publisher should obtain a return on his investment. 
. . . Publishing is close to gambling.  Many of the . . 
. publisher’s books never pay back his initial outlay. 
. . . Thus copyright is necessary to make good 
publishers possible.29
 
This argument may suggest an alignment of interests between authors and 
publishers, though, as argued later, the alignment is certainly not perfect.  
But Chafee cannot explain why the law should then give copyright to authors 
in the first place.   
 
 The traditional rationale for authorial copyright is a natural law, or 
moral argument.  The argument is usually described as the legal offshoot of 
the rise of modern conceptions of the author, popularized by figures like 
Williams Wordsworth.30  Authorial rights exist in law, the argument goes, 
because authors naturally have a right in their work at the moment it is 
created.  We might suggest authorial rights should simply exist because 
authors are worthy of such rights, and giving authors such rights is the right 
thing to.  What you create is yours: “‘to every cow her calf.’”31  Author Victor 
Hugo, stressing the physical control the author has upon creation, put it as 
follows: 
 
Think of a man like Dante, Molière, Shakespeare. 
Imagine him at the time when he has just finished 
a great work. His manuscript is there, in front of 
 
 29 Zechariah Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 508-
10 (1945).  
 30 See, e.g., Peter Jaszi & M. Woodmansee, The Author Effect: Contemporary 
Copyright and Collective Creativity (Editor's Introduction), 10 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 274 
(1992).  The famous preface of William Wordsworth, see Supplementary to the Preface, in 
LITERARY CRITICISM OF WILLIAM WORDSWORTH 158, 184 (Paul M. Zall ed., 1966), is 
sometimes referenced as an expression of these ideas. 
 31 Augustine Birrell, Seven Lectures on the Law and History of Copyright in Books 
42 (1899). 
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him; suppose that he gets the idea to throw it into 
the fire; nobody can stop him. Shakespeare can 
destroy Hamlet, Molière Tartufe, Dante the Hell.32
 
Such moral rights arguments surely cannot be overlooked.  But if they were 
taken seriously, American copyright would look very different that it does 
today.  For example, in the example above, were Dante an employee, writing 
The Divine Comedy as a serial of sorts, the work for hire doctrine would place 
copyright ownership in the hands of his employer, wholly ignoring any moral 
claim of Dante’s to the work.   That is why it may be  useful to look beyond 
the traditional moral reasons in seeking a justification for authorial 
copyright.33  
 
 Here I present a structural argument for authorial copyright.  The 
basic argument is this:  the best reason for vesting copyright in authors is 
that such vesting of rights can be used to seed new modes of production for 
creative works.  That is, although perhaps not making it easy, authorial 
ownership at least makes possible the rise of different modes of production.  
Authorial copyright may, along similar lines, act as a check on the market 
power of dominant distributors.  This is possible because authors have the 
potential to use their independent ownership of copyrights to foster 
independent modes of production.   
 
 The Battle of the Booksellers, detailed below, gives one example of how 
authorial ownership can seed market entry.  In the 18th century, giving 
authors control of copyright was important to the development of a 
competitive booksellers market, as opposed to one dominated by the existing 
publishers’ cartel.  Similarly, in present times, authors with the aid of their 
copyright ownership are helping seed competitive modes of distribution, such 
 
32 Quoted in Karl-Erik Tallmo, The History of Copyright: A Critical Overview With 
Source Texts in Five Languages (forthcoming in 2007). 
 33   Economic analysis of authorial rights in copyright is scarce—the scholarship 
tends to defend copyright at large in economic terms, while describing doctrines related to 
authorial rights in natural law terms. 
One notable exception is the work of Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli who presented 
an economic analysis of various moral rights, such as the right to prevent mutilation of 
visual arts.  Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 25. Their work focused on preventing problems 
like opportunistic owners damaging the greater reputation of the author.  That’s a problem 
that an author is probably well situated to police, giving one set of reasons to vest rights in 
authors.  
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as direct online music sales, limited video projects, and open source software 
production, among others.  In all of these cases, the market entry of a new 
mode of production is aided by the vesting of the copyright in the author. 
 
 The point can be made differently: a reason to have copyright owned by 
authors is as a potential check on the over-centralization of decision-making 
in copyright-related markets.  As I argued in Intellectual Property, 
Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, one of the ways we must assess 
intellectual property is as against how it affects industry structure.34  
“Intellectual property assignments must be assessed not only by the 
incentive/cost tradeoff, but by their effects on the decision architectures 
surrounding the property right—their effects on how firms make product 
innovation decisions.”35  Vesting copyright in authors has the potential to 
quietly influence the industrial structure of the industries centered on 
copyright in useful ways.  Most importantly, authorial ownership can make it 
easier for new forms of production to come into being. 
 
 To develop this argument further, we need develop a different, though 
ultimately related examination of multiple modes of authorship. 
  
 II. Modes of Authorship 
 
 “’What does it matter who is speaking?’ someone said, ‘what does it 
matter who is speaking?’”36  As every student in an English department 
knows, authorship past and present comes in many forms, from the romantic 
model of sole authorship through collaborative works and mass projects 
ascribed to a single author.37  A key premise of this paper is that different 
modes of authorship, or creative production, will be optimal for different 
works and different subject matters at different times.  This section defends 
that premise. 
 
 The production of expressive works can be broken down into three 
standard stages. 
 
r 34 Tim Wu, Intellectual P operty, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 Va. L. 
Rev. 123 (2005). 
 35 Id. at 123. 
 36 Samuel Beckett, The Complete Short Prose 109 (Gontarski ed., 1995).   
 37 For a recent discussion of romantic authorship and its alternatives, see, e.g., 
Richard Posner, The Little Book of Plagarism (2007); Boyle, supra note 19. 
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 At each stage production can be fully open, fully closed, or somewhere 
in between.  By open, I mean that anyone may participate in creating, 
disseminating or improving the product without permission. On the other end 
of the spectrum, in a closed system only one entity has the permission to 
create, disseminate, or improve the work in question.  In between is an 
intermediate level, typified by collaborative works, where permission is given 
in advance to some people to participate in one or more of the three 
production stages. 
 
 
 
 This simple typology describes much, though obviously not all, of the 
modes of production that we see today.  Consider a few examples.  Software 
under an open source license is mostly open in its creation, dissemination, 
and improvement.38  Conversely a typical published novel, closer to 
copyright’s original subject matter, is usually closed at all three stages.  
Many works fall somewhere in between.  A typical paper published in the 
open access Journal of Biology is collaborative in creation, open in 
dissemination, but closed to direct improvement.39
                                            
 38 See Open Source Initiative, The Open Source Definition, 
http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php (last visited Feb. 24, 2007). 
39 For further detail, see the Journal of Biology’s website, http://jbiol.com/info/about 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2007), and the copyright policy of its publisher, BioMed Central, supra 
note 22.  
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 As alluded to above, this paper suggests that different modes will be 
optimal for different projects, subject matters, and industries at different 
times.40  First, consider several examples where preserving a certain mode of 
production for a work can be important to its success.  Consider the example 
of open source software.  It can be damaging to an open source project if 
someone takes the program, improves it, and then distributes a new product 
with the improved source code kept secret.  For that reason most open source 
licenses condition use of the work on a promise to make publicly available the 
source code of improvements made, if the modified program is deployed.41  
For example, the Apple Open Source License states: 
 
If You Externally Deploy Your Modifications, You 
must make Source Code of all Your Externally 
Deployed Modifications either available to those to 
whom You have Externally Deployed Your 
Modifications, or publicly available. Source Code of 
Your Externally Deployed Modifications must be 
released under the terms set forth in this License . . 
. . 42   
 
 Conversely, keeping dissemination closed, or controlled, can be crucial 
to the financial viability of other types of projects.  A film that will cost fifty 
million dollars to produce might only be a worthwhile investment if it can be 
disseminated exclusively in movie theatres at a cost of ten dollars per 
consumer.  Without the power to keep dissemination closed the film may not 
be produced. 
 
 As a final example, suppose a team of scientists publishes a paper 
claiming that sheep can be cloned.43  On the one hand, the scientists almost 
certainly prefer open and wide dissemination of their paper and its results.  
On the other hand, unauthorized editing of the paper could damage the 
 
t
 40 Cf. Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 
Yale L. J. 369 (2002).  
41 See The Open Source Definition, supra note 38. 
 42 Apple Public Source License, § 2.2(c) (v. 2.0 2003), 
http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsi.   
 43 See Keith H.S. Campbell, et al., Sheep cloned by nuclear transfer from a cul ured 
cell line, 380 Nature 64 (1996). 
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reputation of the authors and also harm society more generally if it 
compromises the accuracy of the work.   
  
 From these examples we see that the reasons that make a given mode 
of production optimal in different contexts are complex; nevertheless, we can 
make some general observations.  At the creation stage, the benefits of a 
collaborative or an open system are the possibilities of efficient trade between 
differently specialized actors, as set against the costs of coordinating multiple 
actors.  The creation of a film, just discussed, provides an obvious example of 
where collaboration pays off.  While in theory one person could 
simultaneously serve as director, cinematographer, actor and costume 
designer, rarely are these abilities found in a single person.  Conversely, in 
the creation of a novel, anything more than a writer and editor may lead to 
coordination costs that outweigh any potential benefits.  Sometimes it is 
advantageous to combine one person’s reputation with another’s writing 
skill—as in the example of a ghostwritten book.  Hilary Clinton’s It Takes a 
Village combined her well-known name with the skills of uncredited 
ghostwriter Barbara Feinman.  As Richard Posner reminds us, “you can be 
the author of a work though you were not the writer.”44
 
 At the dissemination stage, the predominant question is what 
combination of direct revenue generation and exposure maximizes the work’s 
value.  In the case of an advertisement or an academic paper, for example, 
the work’s purpose may usually be served by the widest possible distribution.  
It is rare (though not impossible) that an advertiser complains of 
overexposure.  But some works realize greater value for their owners by 
limiting exposure.  For example, investors in a video game that costs millions 
to make may create more value by maximizing revenue at the expense of 
exposure.  For many works the optimal level of openness in dissemination 
may be complex or hard to know as exposure and revenue generation are 
often interrelated.  A music band may benefit from the increased exposure in 
having its music played on the radio or widely downloaded (for free), but it 
will also benefit by limiting the opportunities for free access to its works so 
that people who want to enjoy the works will need to pay for them.45
 
 
 44 Posner, supra note 37, at 28. 
 45 See Mary Madden, Pew Internet & American Life Project, Artists, Musicians and 
the Internet 32, 34-35 (2004). 
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 At the improvement stage there are also various reasons why it might 
be preferable to allow a work to be improved or adapted freely, in a limited 
fashion (derivative works, but no direct improvements), or not at all.  As 
Richard Nelson and Robert Merges originally suggested for patent, increased 
openness in improvement—more freedom to create derivative works—might 
often serve innovation and consumer welfare.46  Proponents of remix culture 
certainly take this view in the copyright context.47  Yet there may be valid 
reasons to vest control over improvement in a limited number of persons.  
Some works, though how many is unclear, might be ruined or overgrazed by 
an open improvement system, as suggested by Posner and Landes.48  More 
frequently, it may also be the case that a closed system of improvement is 
necessary to preserve not the work itself but a series of related interests—for 
example, the author’s reputation, the accuracy of the work, or to prevent 
consumer confusion as to source.49  Scientists, for example, even if they favor 
open dissemination of their work, do not want their papers edited or 
rewritten by others for fear that their findings may be distorted and their 
reputations damaged.50  Even bloggers, who give away their content for free, 
usually want the power to prevent unauthorized distortion of their work.51  In 
short, for a variety of reasons, the optimal degree of openness for 
improvements, as with the other two stages of production, varies. 
 
r
t f e r
 46 Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
Colum. L. Rev. 839, 843 (1990). 
47 See Lawrence Lessig, Free(ing) Cultu e for Remix, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 961, 972-73. 
 48 See Richard Posner & William Landes, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 471 (2003).  My comment on overgrazing is that it might be a possibility for some 
works but not others—that it is hard to say for the full range of potentially copyrightable 
works.  Careful readers will notice that, like Posner and Landes, this work advances a 
justification for the existence of copyright that relies on the static use of copyright to protect 
the integrity of different modes of production. 
 49 Cf. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 25.  It is true that preventing consumer 
confusion is the designated role of trademark, but that does not mean that authors should 
not be able to use copyright for that purpose as well. 
50 Cf. Peter Suber, Open Access to the Scien i ic Journal Lit ratu e, 1 J. Biology 3 
(2002), available at http://jbiol.com/content/pdf/1475-4924-1-3.pdf (noting the ability of open 
access journals to meet scientists’ interests “in dissemination to the widest possible 
audience” while still being able to rely upon copyright to ensure that “authorized copies will 
not mangle or misattribute their work”). 
51 For example, both The Becker-Posner Blog and the blog Boing Boing are licensed 
under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 2.5 License, allowing free reign to 
adapt the work under the conditions that it is used for noncommercial uses and is properly 
attributed to the original authors.  See Creative Commons Deed, Attribution-NonComercial 
2.5, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/ (last visited Mar. 17. 2007). 
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 III. Why a More Neutral Copyright? 
  
 I have suggested that decentralization is desirable because it will lead 
to a more “neutral” copyright system.  But why should legal neutrality as 
between different modes of production be attractive?  There are several 
reasons.  
 
 First, every industry is different, and if copyright chooses to favor a 
mode of production common in one industry it may unwittingly hurt 
production in others.  What is good for the film industry might, for example, 
be bad for the software or publishing industry.  The danger is that copyright, 
if keyed to the mode of production typical of one industry, will slow 
production in other industries.  To the extent that copyright can be modified 
for use in many different industries it will be more useful. 
 
 Second, for reasons that are hard to predict or explain, modes of 
creative production may evolve over time.  Different modes of authorship 
seem to come into vogue at different times in history—at some points, 
improvement-driven authorship seems more important, at other points, 
collaborative writing, and yet at other points, the romantic model of 
authorship. 
 
 Given this constant shift, it would be a mistake for copyright to focus 
only on encouraging the mode of authorship it takes to be predominant, even 
if such a system might benefit a good deal of the present content production. 
For all we know, the novels of the future will be created more like open-
source software or science papers, by large teams of authors.  Similarly, the 
currently-popular open source model of software development might someday 
revert back to a more closed, romantic author model.  While these 
developments sound unlikely, so, perhaps, did the idea of the novel to one 
generation or writers, or the idea of Linux to different generation of 
programmers.  And for that reason changing copyright to encourage only one 
mode of production would be a mistake.  Whether or not these or other modes 
of production will gain prominence, the point is simply that we do not know 
what will happen in the future, and neither does Congress, the Free Software 
Foundation, or the Recording Industry Association of America. That makes 
some humility and as much neutrality as possible an attractive goal.  
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 Third, industries themselves will die and be born, and as neutral a 
copyright as possible may facilitate that process.  One hundred and twenty 
years ago the film, recording and radio broadcast industries did not exist.  
Instead, the dominant creative industries were the book publishers, sheet-
music producers, and the stage.52  As economist Joseph Schumpeter taught, 
industrial succession is the essence of a capitalist system, and copyright, like 
any law, always risks becoming a form of protection for the industries of the 
present at the expense of those of the future.53  A law that privileges the 
modes of production common to present creative industries may slow, or even 
prevent, their replacement by the industries of the future.  
 
 The changing modes of production and multiple industry problems are 
two well-recognized issues in copyright law.  To deal with the range of 
industries affected by copyright, scholars occasionally recommend creating 
multiple sui generis intellectual property schemes.54  Such content-specific 
regimes, however, have even greater problems of obsolesce.  In practice they 
have a mixed track record: the special system for Digital Audio Tapes (DAT) 
adopted in 1992 is classic example of a failed effort to adapt copyright to 
specific technology.55 Another solution is to interpret copyright differently for 
different industries, as in the various special doctrines that surround 
software, but this method also has its limits.56
 
 This paper suggests that the best solution to these problems lies in a 
neutral copyright system, and that the principal means for achieving this 
 
r s
t
e r
r
 52 See generally Edward B. Samuels, An Illustrated Story of Copyright Pt. I (2000).  
 53 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, And Democracy 61 (1950). 
 54 See, e.g., Eliana Torrelly de Carvalho, Protection of Traditional Biodiversity-
Related Knowledge: Analysis of P opo als for the Adoption of a Sui Generis System, 10 Mo. 
Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 38, 53-58 (2003); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui 
Generis Protection of Da abases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151, 
171-76 (1997); Regan E. Keebaugh, Note, Int llectual Property and the P otection of 
Industrial Design, 13 J. Intell. Prop. L. 255, 275-77 (2005); Pamela Samuelson et al., A 
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer P ograms, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308 
(1994).  
 55 See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10.  Some attribute 
DAT’s current obscurity to the additional burdens imposed on the technology by this 
regulation.  See Nichelle Nicholes Levy, Method to Their Madness: The Secure Digital Music 
Initiative, A Law and Economics Perspective, 5 Va. J. L. & Tech. 12, at *27 (2000), 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/issue3/v5i3a12-Levy.html.  
 56 See, e.g., Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding reverse 
engineering of a video game to achieve interoperability to be fair use).   
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neutrality is to maximize the decentralization of copyright ownership and 
enforcement.  When as many entities as possible control the ownership or 
enforcement of copyright, they may experiment with many different modes of 
production, from which the fittest will survive.  Author Cory Doctorow and 
economist Gary Becker are two examples of experimenters.  Doctorow, who 
writes science fiction novels like Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom, makes 
his novels available electronically for free, while his publisher sells print 
versions.57  It may turn out that Doctorow’s novels actually sell more in print 
when disseminated electronically for free, and consequently also reach many 
more people.  Doctorow may also be wrong, and it may turn out that making 
a book available for free will hurt his reputation and destroy any hope either 
he or the publisher have of making a profit.  The point is not that free online 
dissemination is necessarily superior to the traditional modes of book 
dissemination.  The point is simply that it may be, and to some degree it is 
the copyright system that is helping make this experiment possible. 
  
 Economist Gary Becker, meanwhile, in 2005 replaced his weekly 
column at Businessweek Magazine with a blog.58  The blog is free, unlike the 
column, which came with the paid-for magazine.  As with Doctrow, whether 
or not this was a wise idea, the point is that the current copyright system 
allows for these, and other, forms of decentralized experimentation.  The 
mechanism for this phenomenon is the frequently overshadowed initial 
vesting of copyright in authors. This initial vesting is a critical mechanism of 
decentralization, and what has already encouraged the multiple modes of 
production I have described.  It turns out that this role is no accident, as the 
next section shows.  
 
IV. How Authors’ Rights Might Decentralize 
 
 The vesting of rights in authors can serve as a potentially important 
check on the centralization of copyright ownership.59  What follows is no 
original contribution to writings on copyright’s history, or the history of 
authorship.  However, the story of the birth of author’s rightsis a good 
 
 57 See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom (2003), freely 
downloadable, in many formats, at http://craphound.com/down/download.php (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2007). 
58 See  Posting of Richard Posner to the Becker-Posner Blog, Introduction to the 
Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2004/12/introduction_to_1.html (Dec. 5, 2004, 12:23AM). 
 59 See generally Wu, supra note 34.  
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example of how the decentralization-function of authorial copyright can 
function. 
 
 As most copyright scholars know, early in English copyright history 
rights to copy were vested in publishers (then called stationers).60  As Ray 
Patterson tells us, “copyright began as a publisher’s right, a right which 
functioned in the interest of the publisher, with no concern for the author.”61  
One early function of this right was censorship, but another was the 
management of competition as between members of the stationer’s guild.62  
One publisher might have had the exclusive rights to publish the works of 
Isaac Newton and another the exclusive right to publish the St. James Bible.  
The allocation of exclusive rights prevented competition between different 
versions of the same book.  Like any cartel, the publishers regarded 
competition as undesirable, and sought to destroy competition between its 
members as well as from outside the guild.63  As Joseph Lowenstein writes, 
the stationer’s copyright “was a privilege conferred by the guild on one of its 
members, part of an imperfect but not ineffective system by which the guild 
sought to preserve internal order.”64
 
 In the 18th century, unfortunately for the stationer’s cartel, 
outsiders—Scottish and Irish publishers—eventually began to bring 
competing books to market.  With this came history’s first accusations of 
copyright piracy.  The efforts of the cartel to stop the pirates using copyright 
law created the first of many conflicts between rival disseminators:  the 
famous “Battle of the Booksellers.”65  For at least fifty years the incumbent 
publishers successfully enforced England’s copyright law, the 1710 Statute of 
Anne, to block their rivals.  But by the late 18th century, the Statute of Anne 
was interpreted in an innovative way: to vest copyright in authors as opposed 
 
60 Relevant works to this history include Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View Of 
Copyright (1967); Joseph Lowenstein, The Author’s Due: Printing and the Prehistory of 
Copyright (2002); Harry Ransom, The First Copyright Statute (1956); Lyman Ray Patterson, 
Copyright in Historical Perspective (1968); Grantland Rice, The Transformation Of 
Authorship In America (1997). 
 61 Patterson, supra note 60, at 8. 
 62 Id. at 43-44. 
 63 To a large extent, copyright still plays a role in managing competition between 
disseminators.  See generally Wu, supra note 16.   
 64 Lowenstein, supra note 60, at 29.  
65 For an in-depth discussion of the Battle of the Booksellers, see Mark Rose, Authors 
and Owners: The Invention of Copyright 67-91 (1994). 
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to publishers.  It is somewhat unclear if this was actually the purpose of the 
Statute, as many doubt that a real system of author’s rights was what 
Parliament had in mind.66  But in the hands of “rationalizing” English 
judges, most famously in the case Donaldson v. Beckett, 67 the system of 
rights vested in authors rather than publishers became the norm.68  
 
 The House of Lords’ ingenious idea in Donaldson was to use authors as 
a wedge to force open competition in book publishing.  Their interpretation of 
the Statute of Anne made it hard for the publisher’s cartel to survive.  While 
authors still had far less market power than publishers, they had at least the 
capacity to take their copyrights with them and market their works through 
competing publishers.  The basic concept is that by giving the legal rights to 
the author, the author became an independent, vested economic entity that 
made competing modes of production possible.  While not exactly a romantic 
vision of authorship, the significance of authors as independently vested 
entities nonetheless changed the history both of copyright and publishing. 
 
 In this use of the author to open the publishing market we can see the 
glimmer of a deeper idea.  In breaking the stationers’ cartel the recognition of 
the author made possible more variety in how books were published.  Authors 
could promote competition among disseminators, and more broadly, 
competition among modes of production in the centuries to follow.  Today, for 
example, authors’ rights might promote competition not only between 
Random House and Bloomsburg, but also between open and closed software 
production, as well as mainstream and open access academic publishers. 
 
 
 66 Benjamin Kaplan explains:  
 It is hard to know how far the interests of authors were considered in 
distinction from those of publishers.  There is an apparent tracing of rights to 
an ultimate source in the fact of authorship, but before attaching large 
importance to this we have to note that if printing as a trade was not to be 
put back into the hands of a few as a subject of monopoly—if the statute was 
intended to be a kind of “universal patent”—a draftsman would naturally be 
led to express himself in terms of rights in books and hence of initial rights in 
authors . . . I think it nearer to the truth to say that publishers saw the 
tactical advantage of putting forward authors’ interests with their own . . . .  
Kaplan, supra note 60, at 8.  
 67 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774), reprinted in 17 Cobbett’s Parl. Hist. 953 (1813). 
 68 See Kaplan, supra note 60, at 23-25; Patterson, supra note 60, at 7; Lowenstein 
supra note 60, at 29. 
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 The Battle of the Booksellers suggests one answer to the question of 
authorial copyright.   Vesting copyright in authors can help promote 
competition in dissemination. Stated otherwise, this part of history shows 
how authorial rights can serve as a slow-burning remedy for structural 
problems in the production of expressive works. 
 
 V. The Relevance of the Termination of Transfer Right 
 
 This discussion of the authorial role also provides a new understanding 
of the economic function of the author’s termination of transfer right found in 
section 203 of the Copyright Code.  That section gives the author a right to 
nullify most copyright assignments and licenses thirty-five years following 
the assignment or license (details are in the footnote).69  If, for example, J.K. 
Rawlings had in 1997 transferred her U.S. rights in Harry Potter and the 
Philosopher’s Stone to her publisher Scholastic, she would have the right 
under U.S. law to regain the copyright in the year 2032. 
 
 The termination right is usually described as a means of correcting 
uneven bargaining conditions at the time at copyright assignment, giving the 
author a second chance to assess the bargain thirty-five years later.70  The 
right is unpopular with disseminators, for obvious reasons, as it creates the 
possibility of losing rights of potential value, and as we shall discuss, rights 
that can create potential competitors.71  Consistent with the theory discussed 
in this article, we can describe a different economic function and impact of 
the transfer termination right. By giving rights back to authors, it provides 
the potential to seed the development of new forms or industries of 
dissemination that might otherwise be blocked. 
 
 
t
f
 69 Section 203 of Title 17 gives the original author or her heirs the right to terminate 
assignments and licenses after 35 years after assignment, or 40 years after publication if the 
publication right was granted.  17 U.S.C. §203(a)(3); see also 17 U.S.C. §304(c) (termination 
right for works under copyright as of 1978).  Works for hire are excluded from the provision.  
§ 203(a).  In addition, the author does not regain control of any derivative works made while 
the agreement was in effect.  See §203(b)(1), construed in Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder 
469 U.S. 153 (1985).  For even more detail, see Melville B. Nimmer Termina ion of Transfers 
under the Copyright Act of 1976, 125 Pa. L. Rev. 947 (1977). 
70 See Nimmer, supra note 69, at 949-50.  
 71 Stephen W. Tropp, It had to be Murder, or Will Be Soon – 17 U.S.C. § 203 
Termination o  Transfers: a Call for Legislative Reform, 51 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 797 
(2004) (detailing why, from the industry’s perspective, termination rights might create 
problems). 
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 Incumbent disseminators often see new channels or technologies of 
dissemination as a competitive threat, and try to slow, block or take control of 
any such innovations to prevent being displaced in the market. Sometimes, 
as detailed in the paper Copyright’s Communications Policy, incumbents use 
copyright as a means to try and block or squeeze new rivals, as opposed to 
welcoming them as a potential source of licensing revenue.72  The most recent 
example is seen in the early struggle over online music in the early 2000s 
that lead to both Grokster and the rise of iTunes.73  The early days of record 
players, radio, cable, and satellite track a similar pattern.74
 
 While mechanisms like fair use and compulsory licenses are often used 
to settle these kind of disputes, the reassertion of authorial rights through 
the exercise of Section 203’s termination right provides another mechanism 
to curb the use of copyright to block market entrants.  Authors by definition 
are usually not stakeholders in any particular form of dissemination.  While a 
record label may care iIf a composer sells one thousand CDs or iTunes 
albums he is, all else being equal, indifferent. In both instances he reaches 
his audience and makes money.   And for that reason, authors, just as in the 
Battle of the Booksellers example above, may decide to take their rights to 
competitive disseminators or even potentially become disseminators 
themselves. 
 
 Authors holding a reverted copyright may be particularly well-situated 
to seed competition in content distribution.  Only a tiny number of works are 
still actively marketed thirty-five years after assignment.  An author holding 
a reverted right may (successfully or not) try to breath new life into an old 
work, by making it available through channels that did not exist at the time 
of assignment. 
 
 Unfortunately, the actual effectiveness of this mechanism is difficult to 
gauge, and the reverter right seems to be less known and less used than was 
intended.  However the logic of this paper provides a new defense and new 
explanation for the reverter rights in the copyright statute. 
  
 VI. Conclusion 
 
 
72 See generally Wu, supra note 16. 
73 See id. at 360-66. 
74 See id. at 288-341. 
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 The 2004 Presidential election campaign was best captured not by the 
thousands of editorials, columns, or feature articles, but rather something 
called the “JibJab” parody.  JibJab was a cartoon animation featuring 
candidates George Bush and John Kerry trading insults to the tune of the 
Woodie Guthrie’s tune “This Land is My Land.”  “You’re a sissy liberal,” sang 
the cartoon Bush; “You’re a right wing-nut job” responded cartoon Kerry.  
“This land will surely vote for me,” sang both in the chorus.75
 
 The free and easily downloadable animation quickly spread around the 
nation and the world.  But on July 28, 2004 its authors received a letter from 
lawyers working for music publisher Ludlow, Inc., the ostensible owner of the 
copyright to “This Land is My Land.”  The letter stated that JibJab 
“constitutes a blatant and willful copyright infringement which has caused, 
and continues to cause . . . serious injury.”76  Kathryn Ostien, a spokeswoman 
for Ludlow stated to the press that Jib-Jab “puts a completely different spin 
on the song,” and that "the damage to the song is huge."77
 
 Legal academics, bloggers, and other critics seized on the threat as a 
prime example of copyright’s excesses.  The Electronic Freedom Frontier 
stated “it looks like yet another parodist interested in free expression will be 
called upon to risk litigation in order to vindicate our First Amendment 
rights.”78  The Dallas Morning News wrote “It's irreverent. It's funny. It jabs 
both sides. The true danger would be a lack of good satire in a presidential 
 
75 JibJab, This Land!, http://www.jibjab.com/originals/originals/jibjab/movieid/65 (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2007).  
76 Letter from Ludlow’s counsel, Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal to JibJab (Jul. 23, 
2004), quoted in Complaint ¶ 13, JibJab Media, Inc. v. Ludlow Music, Inc. (N.D. Cal filed Jul. 
29, 2004), available at 
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/JibJab_v_Ludlow/20040729_JibJab_Complaint.pdf. 
 77 See Allen Wastler, CNNMoney.com, A Jibjab showdown, July 26, 2004, 
http://money.cnn.com/2004/07/26/commentary/wastler/wastler/. 
 78 EFF Deeplinks, This Land Isn’t Your Land (Jul. 26, 2004), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/001765.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2007). 
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election year.”79 Joining the chorus were Woody Guthrie’s heirs.  “That 
parody was made for you and me,” said granddaughter Cathy Guthrie.80
 
 Like the Bridgeport example we encountered at the start of this paper, 
the problem with the JibJab litigation was not necessarily a problem of too 
much copyright as many have concluded.  Again, it can be equally concluded 
that the allocation of rights is to blame.  Based on what they said, Guthrie’s 
heirs or Guthrie himself would have been fine with the JibJab tune, avoiding 
litigation in advance.  But what Ludlow did was predictable: it tried to 
maximize the value of its existing assets, which (it thought) included the 
Guthrie copyright. Unfortunately, Ludlow’s interests happened to be at odds 
with the both the author’s and the public’s interest. Fair use is the traditional 
way of solving such conflicts, but as this paper has suggested, there is 
another way—a way that can avoid litigation all together, and 
simultaneously promote the neutrality of copyright through increased 
decentralization.  The final irony of the JibJab litigation is that it was, in 
fact, solved by the route of ownership rather than fair use.  On closer 
examination, Ludlow’s ownership of the copyright in Guthrie’s song proved 
unclear, and the case quickly settled.81
 
 The question of whether copyright should serve authors or publishers 
is as old as copyright.82  While sentiment has always favored authors, I argue 
that the economics of copyright also support more authorial control over the 
enforcement of copyright.  At a minimum judges and policy-makers should 
reacquaint themselves with the difference between disseminator and author 
interests in the ownership and enforcement of copyright.   
 
o e
79 Corante, JibJab Files Lawsuit for Right to Distribute Parody?, 
http://importance.corante.com/archives/2004/07/31/jibjab_files_lawsuit_for_right_to_distribut
e_parody.php (Jul. 31, 2004) (citing Dallas Morning News, If this is danger, bring it on (Jul. 
31, 2001)). 
80 Posting of Mark Frauenfelder to Boing Boing, Cathy Guthrie’s opinion of the 
JibJab parody of her grandfather’s song, 
http://www.boingboing.net/2004/08/06/cathy_guthries_opini.html (Aug. 6, 2004, 10:43AM).  
81 See EFF: DeepLinks, This Song Belongs to You and Me (Aug. 24, 2004), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/001840.php.  
 82 See generally Maureen O’Rourke, A Brief History f Author-Publisher R lations 
and the Outlook for the 21st Century, 50 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 425 (2003). 
 
 
